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2008 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES FROM THE PENNSYLVANIA
PERSPECTIVE
The 2008 Democratic Primaries were unique due to many factors. They will be remembered 
most of all for Democratic Party’s clash between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. The 
main stage of this extended race was Pennsylvania, traditionally one of the most crucial bat-
tleground states. During the 2008 primaries, however, Pennsylvania was unusually impor-
tant in determining who would become one of the major party’s presidential nominee. For 
six weeks, between March 11 and April 22, 2008, there was no other primary election held 
in the United States. Thus, the remaining candidates and their camps, as well as the eyes of 
the nation, were turned to the campaign that was conducted in the Keystone State. What 
this essay tries to present is the impact the primaries in Pennsylvania had on the presidential 
nomination process of the Democratic Party. The author argues that while technically ap-
pealing to voters of the Pennsylvania primary, candidates were actually running a national 
campaign. It was during these primaries that the national candidate for the Democratic Party 
emerged.
When many passages of this paper were first drafted, in the last week of April 2008, 
it was not certain yet not only who would win the presidency, but also which two 
candidates would be seeking it. At that time, the never-ending story of the Democratic 
primaries was to continue for several more weeks. After the 2008 presidential race 
some analysts indicated the long primary campaign as one of the keys to the general 
election win, but in spring many thought of the exhausting Clinton-Obama clash as 
a sign of deep divisions in the Democratic Party, both among its establishment and 
electorate, divisions that could not be overcome in a short period of time. The aim of 
this paper is to put the unique primaries in Pennsylvania in the context of the 2008 
presidential primary season in the United States. This uniqueness was created due to 
candidates trying to appeal to primary voters in Pennsylvania, traditionally one of the 
crucial swing states in the fall, but technically running a national campaign, as at this 
stage the Democratic Party presidential nomination was thought to be decided by 
super-delegates, who can freely switch candidates they would support. As the nomi-
nation was secured, the Keystone State primary was indicated as the time when the 
national candidate emerged.
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I
While at the time of the Pennsylvania primary there was a long way to conclude the 
drama of the 2008 presidential election cycle in the United States, the conventional 
wisdom was that the process would be unique, as it actually was, due to many fac-
tors. Most of all, for the first time in U.S. history an African-American candidate was 
one of the major party’s presidential nominees, the candidate that eventually won the 
election. In addition, George W. Bush’s spending record1 from the 2004 campaign 
was broken, and political consultants came up with a brilliant strategy to ensure an 
overwhelming victory, both of which will be studied for ages. The new media involve-
ment – with an even more extensive use of the Internet than we observed during the 
2006 midterm election – was clearly broadened and has introduced the conducting of 
a political campaign to some new patterns. There certainly were many “firsts” in the 
2008 electoral cycle. But it seems, among all these elements, either implied or real 
“new ones,” that one factor remained unchanged – by which I mean the advantage of 
certain kind of states over the others.
As it is widely known, U.S. citizens elect their presidents indirectly. The system of 
Electoral College requires receiving at least 270 electoral, not popular, votes to win 
the presidential election. Each state has a different number of these votes, which is 
decided on the population census basis. But it is wrong one to think that it is enough 
to campaign in the eleven states richest in electoral votes, carry all of them, get 
271 votes, and become the President. Regions and states differ in terms of society, 
economy, and politics. All these contrasts, along with the historical, demographical, 
educational, etc., background, are behind the decision of which candidate to support. 
If still undecided, the local political and election machine is always there to help make 
the “right” decision.
However, if the only type of campaign inhabitants know is the one they see in 
the media, we are probably referring to the people living in the safe states. As for the 
electoral map for November 2008, it seemed unlikely to see a conservative Republican 
carrying the states of Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey or New York. Respectively, 
a Democratic Party candidate should not count on winning in Texas, Mississippi and 
South Carolina. This election geography has made the above-mentioned states almost 
dead in terms of the existence of any contemporary presidential campaigning events 
or efforts. If the polls indicate the candidate leads somewhere by 20 or so points, it is 
pointless to waste resources there. With the winner-takes-all-system in all of the states, 
with the exception only of Maine and Nebraska, there will probably not be a visible 
campaign in Texas in the foreseeable future, as winning in the Lone Star State by 
one vote, double digit or collecting every single vote means the same – 34 votes in 
the Electoral College. This is why in the 2004 presidential campaign, only one TV ad, 
worth $127, was aired in Texas (Who Picks the President 2009: 4).
But there were also many states with not even a single ad, event, or campaign of-
fice. “If a state is safe, it is not worth additional effort; if it is lost, further actions are 
not necessary” (Maisel, Buckley 2005: 335) Thus the majority of the resources are used 
in the purple states.2 They are called purple because after the poll conducted before 
the general election they can be classified as neither red nor blue. Such a visualisa-
1  $345 million, as indicated by The Center for Responsive Politics website www.opensecrets.org, 
providing  the fund-raising and fund-spending data in electoral processes in the United States. 
2  The other name is swing state or battleground state.
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tion was first introduced in the election of 2000, “when the electoral map appeared in 
The New York Times, with the states carried by George W. Bush covered in red, and 
those supporting Al Gore in blue” (Ceaser, Busch 2005: 1). Ever since, if the state is 
predicted to vote Republican, it is called red, if Democrat, it is blue. States that are 
unsure are purple – simply the mixture of red and blue. It is in these purple states 
where the visits and events take place all the time, where candidates and surrogates 
mostly arrive, and where most phone calls with political agitation are made. It is in 
the purple states where a large number of TV ads are aired, and huge money is spent. 
According to FairVote – The Center for Voting and Democracy’s Presidential Election 
Reform Program, in the 2004 election, eleven states classified by the pollsters as bat-
tleground received 92% of the election visits, and 96% of all the TV ad money were 
spent there (Who Picks the President 2009: 3). However, even among those eleven, the 
most important ones were those with the highest number of electoral votes. Florida, 
Ohio and Pennsylvania are traditionally the hardest fought campaigns, in particular in 
the elections that are supposed to be very close. In 2004 there were 55,477 ads aired 
in Florida, 44,131 in Ohio, and 30,228 in Pennsylvania, and their cost was 64, 47 and 
36 million dollars respectively (Who Picks the President 2009: 13–14). Whether the ef-
fect of the ads was worth the money is quite a question. But the conventional wisdom 
before every presidential election has been that the winning candidate will be the one 
to carry at least two of these three most important swing states.
As for Florida, its importance has been demonstrated many times, for example dur-
ing the 36 days in the fall of 2000, when it was too close to call a winner, keeping the 
nation and the world uncertain. The popular political saying is As Ohio goes, so goes 
the nation (As Ohio Goes 2008: A10). Indeed, the Buckeye State seems to be crucial if 
we consider that in the 20th century, the only election winners not to carry Ohio were 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944, and John F. Kennedy in 1960. 
When it comes to Pennsylvania, many political strategists and analysts say the road 
to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue3 goes through the fields of the State of Independence. 
For a Democrat dreaming about the Oval Office it is an absolute must-win state, while 
Republicans claim that if they carry PA, they will win nationally. It was the Keystone 
State that turned out to be the key for Democrats in the 2008 primary season. For sev-
en weeks – between March 11, and April 22 – it was a ground war, a battle between 
Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama.
II
Pennsylvania has always been important for determining who the White House host 
would be, and was even more important for the origins of the Republic. It was in 
Philadelphia that the Continental Congress convened, and the meeting of the Consti-
tutional Convention took place. For ten years, at the end of the 18th century, the city 
served as the country’s first capital. It was the Keystone State that gave birth to the 
country’s greatest minds, such as Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris, and Gouverneur 
Morris, to name only a few. Throughout American history, “the state’s contribution to 
the industrial, agricultural, social, artistic, religious and political well-being of the na-
3  Washington, DC, postal address of the White House.
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tion have been extensive and continuous. The state is large, and its people and politics 
are as varied as its geography” (Treadway 2005: 1).
In 2000, Pennsylvania had 12.2 million4 citizens, the fifth highest number in the Un-
ion. The two biggest and most important cities – Philadelphia and Pittsburgh – were 
populated, respectively, by around 5 million and 400,000 people. 10% of habitants of 
the state are African-American, while 4% were born beyond the American borders. 
Of 12 million people, half are descendants of German, 2 million of Irish, and 1.5 mil-
lion of Italian immigrants. There are about 3.9 million Catholics, 2.8 million of various 
kinds of Protestants, some Jews, Quakers, and Amish in PA. In 2000, the average in-
come of Pennsylvanians was slightly over $31,000, making it the 15th highest earning 
state. Still, 11% of the state’s residents live under the poverty line. At the beginning of 
the 20th century, the main revenue of the state was from coal, coke, steel, and agricul-
ture. The latter decreased substantially – from the 19 million acres cultivated in 1900, 
all that was left a hundred years later was only 7,7 million acres. When it comes to 
coal, its contribution to the country’s extraction decreased from 57% in 1900 to 6% in 
2000. Similarly, the contribution of steel production is 7% nowadays, compared with 
60% at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
As Jack Treadway demonstrates, when it comes to state politics, at the beginning 
of the 20th century the Keystone State was governed by Republicans. The Grand 
Old Party politicians held the offices of governor, mayor, and other important state 
and local positions. Between 1900 and 1932, only two among 63 of the Democratic 
Party candidates running for various state posts were successful. This trend started 
to change in 1933, when the Democrats took control of Pittsburgh, after Republican 
domination in sixty-six of the previous eighty years. Finally, in 1951, they managed to 
regain power in Philadelphia, where the GOP had dominated in the previous eighty-
one years. More or less since the 50s, “Pennsylvania has been perceived as a two-
party, and therefore swing, state” (Treadway 2005: 11).
When it comes to electing the president, in the 20th century only Wilson in 1912 
and 1916, Roosevelt in 1932, Nixon in 1968, and more recently, Bush in 2000 and 
2004, have won the election without Pennsylvania. Though the game that was still in 
play in spring 2008 was closed only to registered Democrats, it could excellently serve 
as a great rehearsal for the candidates and their campaign organizations. It was also 
a kind of foretaste of how the campaign in the swing state might look in the fall.
III
In 2008 Democratic Party Primaries in Pennsylvania candidates were campaigning for 
158 delegates for the Party Convention, which was held in August in Denver. Howev-
er, in contrast to the general election, or the Republican Primaries, where the winner-
-takes-all system is in place, the Democratic Party delegates are won proportionally. In 
August 2008, the Keystone State also sent to Denver 26 super-delegates, who, unlike 
delegates, were not committed to any of the candidates.
Since the 70s, when the system of pledged delegates was introduced, the primary 
election in Pennsylvania has mattered only once – as local reporter reminds, “in 1976 
Jimmy Carter carried 64 out of 67 counties to secure the Democratic Party presiden-
4  All of the data in the following (II) part of this essay is gathered from Treadway 2005: 1–23.
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tial nomination” (Infield 2008: A01). Ever since, due to the process of front-loading 
presidential caucuses and primaries by other states, Pennsylvania residents have voted 
when the nomination had already been clinched. While other states set their voting 
day at as early a date as possible, the primaries in Pennsylvania were held on the tra-
ditional day, which is the fourth Tuesday in April.
The development of new media, or electronic media, requires a good result and 
strong standing in the polls after Iowa and New Hampshire vote – traditionally the 
first causus and the primary elections, where the attention of the whole nation and the 
world is directed. A good result there almost guarantees the boost of a candidate. It 
can ensure name identification and recognition among voters, and free media cover-
age. It may strengthen the position of a frontrunner, or force a candidate to withdraw 
from the race. These factors may result in bringing new supporters – voters, volun-
teers, and people willing to contribute financially to the campaign. As fund-raising 
and fund-spending is a neverending activity in the contemporary campaigns, the more 
new supporters a candidate has, the bigger chance more people will offer financial 
resources.
Money is also a reason for frontloading primaries for authorities in many states. If 
a candidate secures the nomination quickly, their willingness to campaign vigorously 
in the remaining states decreases. Less active campaigning in the state means less 
money for radio, TV and newspaper ads, fewer buttons and bumperstickers; it means 
no money for hotels, food and gas spent by staffers and media people covering the 
efforts, and no cheques for local political consultants and citizens involved in the elec-
tion process. As a result, the state will be a black hole on the election map where each 
precinct wants to be considered important.
So when 24 states decided to hold their caucuses and primaries on the earliest 
possible date – February 5 – Pennsylvania Democrats also suggested a similar move. 
However, the idea was rejected by both state Republicans and the Democratic Na-
tional Committee, and primaries were held on the traditional day. With this decision 
in place, it seemed the Keystone State would not matter in the 2008 primary season. 
But after February 5 – Super Tuesday – neither candidate emerged as the presump-
tive nominee.5 At the beginning of March, when primaries ended in Texas and Ohio, 
only Republican John McCain gained the required number of delegates to secure the 
nomination. In the Democrat camp the ball was still in play. The early front-runner, 
the winner of the so-called exhibition season, or invisible primary, the senator repre-
senting the state of New York and former First Lady Hillary Clinton, was surprisingly 
matched by the Illinois senator, Barack Obama. Both candidates, the only ones re-
maining in the race, almost equally shared the popular vote, as well as delegate and 
super-delegate gains. 
It seems reasonable to argue that Clinton’s strategists simply did not believe any-
one could be a threat on her way to the nomination. But the charismatic Illinois 
senator, formerly first African-American Editor-in-Chief of the prestigious Harvard Law 
Review, turned out to be a dark horse. Obama won in Iowa, lost in New Hampshire 
by a very slim margin (37-39 to Clinton), then again won, this time in South Carolina, 
by 30 points. While during Super Tuesday Hillary won the so-called large states (rich 
in electoral votes in the general election, i.e. California, New York, New Jersey, Mas-
5  Presumptive nominee is a term given the person who was a winner of their party’s presidential 
primaries, but to  whom the nomination has not yet been given by the Convention.
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sachusetts), Obama won more small states, and it was him to gain momentum after 
February 5. After Super Tuesday, Obama won eleven caucus and primary battles, ten 
by large margins. The momentum let him take the fund-raising offensive and brought 
new supporters. More importantly, a shift in super-delegates could be observed. In-
creased media attention made him a new front-runner for the Democratic Party nomi-
nation.
At the same time Clinton’s organisation was in collapse. After losing eleven states, 
the Empire State senator was forced to change key people in her camp. She had to 
face the departure of supporters and close allies (e.g. Bill Richardson), as well as the 
need of borrowing money for her campaign. Despite these dramatic events, Clinton 
won Texas and crucial for the general election, Ohio, which let her become a come-
back kid, the same way her husband Bill did after the 1992 New Hampshire primary. 
As there was no other state to vote between March 11 and April 22, after 145 years 
another crucial battle was to be fought on the fields of Pennsylvania. For a period of 
seven weeks, “the Keystone State was supposed to be a key” (Skiba 2008: 27).
Surveys taken between March 10 and 16 by the Quinnipiac University Polling In-
stitute indicated Clinton’s 12-point-lead in Pennsylvania. But Obama had no intention 
of giving the states up without a fight, and in the fifth week of the campaign alone, 
the Illinois senator spent 2.2 million dollars on TV ads (Drobnyk 2008: A1). Despite 
good standings, also Hillary, along with her family – daughter Chelsea, and husband, 
former President Bill Clinton – campaigned hard in Pennsylvania. Hillary met mainly 
with women, Chelsea was active on the college and university campuses, while Bill 
travelled around giving several speeches a day. Almost the whole of the state’s Demo-
cratic Party machine started working for the candidate Clinton – “Hillary received 
endorsement from the state Party Chairman J.T. Rooney, and state Executive Director 
Mary Isenhour was put in charge of Clinton’s organization in the state” (Seelye 2008: 
A16). But probably the biggest asset was the support Clinton gained from the Gov-
ernor of the Keystone State, Ed Rendell. This charismatic chief executive of the state, 
former Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, campaigned with passion on 
Clinton behalf. As Time magazine’s correspondent indicates, “his fund-raising talents, 
along with the very effective election machine, are legendary in the Pennsylvania 
politics” (Tumulty 2008: 42). The Obama camp received endorsement only from Sena-
tor Bob Casey, Jr., son of the former popular governor and senator, Bob Casey, who 
died in 2000.
In such a tense and dramatic set of events, in an important race and the strategic 
state, some tension was inevitable. The Obama camp held a case against the Clinton 
people for not calling their candidate “Obama” or “Senator Obama,” but instead us-
ing the phrase “my opponent.” In their turn, Obama’s people called Clinton to resign 
because of Obama winning more caucuses and primaries (27 to 14). This opinion was 
instantly raised by Obama supporters in the media and in Congress. They argued that 
Clinton had fewer delegates, had won in fewer states, had received fewer popular 
votes, and with the high numbers of negative electorates she would not be ready for 
a successful run in the general election against the GOP candidate. 
During the Pennsylvania campaign, with more scrutiny on the candidate Obama, 
some new controversies began surrounding the Illinois senator. The influence on him 
of Reverend Jeremiah Wright, whom Obama was so long not too determined to de-
nounce, or too general watchwords of his campaign (what does the candidate mean 
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exactly by “CHANGE” and “HOPE”). Finally, there was a bitter comment that Obama 
made at the venue near San Francisco at the beginning of April. During the fund-rais-
ing event, Obama stated,
You go into these small towns in Pennsylvania and, like a lot of small towns in the Midwest, 
the jobs have been gone for 25 years and nothing’s replaced them. And it’s not surprising, 
then, they get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren’t like 
them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustra-
tions (Zeleny 2008: A15).
Analysts were saying that “the words were likely to hurt Obama with working-class 
voters and to allow his political opponents, Democratic and Republican, to portray him 
as a snob” (Eichel, Fitzgerald, Couloumbis 2008: A01). Apart from the words, inhabit-
ants of Pennsylvania also did not like the context in which they were said. The senator 
expressed this opinion outside the state, after a few days of campaigning there. The 
words from the speech at a closed event were not supposed to be quoted anywhere. 
Interestingly, the transcript was leaked to the press by an anonymous Obama staffer, 
who thought it was not alright. To make matters worse, at the time of the statement, 
or rather misstatement, the polls were showing Hillary Clinton was dropping her lead 
in the Keystone State to only six points (Quinnipiac University poll, 3–6 April). After 
the above words were revealed, however, Obama was unable to carry on closing the 
gap. Many commentators and analysts argued that Obama’s slip, along with Clinton’s 
intensive campaign and Rendell’s endorsement and service, were the main reasons for 
Hillary Clinton beating Barack Obama in the 2008 Pennsylvania primary. This time, 
Clinton managed to extend her fight at the very last moment again. Such a claim seems 
to be quite reasonable, as even some state Democratic Party officials admitted that, 
“if Hillary Clinton shall win with less than a 5-point difference it would be a time to 
withdraw from the race, endorse senator Obama, and appeal to her supporters to vote 
for Obama in the general election.”6
IV
In the 2008 Pennsylvania Democratic Party primaries Hillary Clinton defeated Barack 
Obama by a clear margin. Eventually, however, this win was not big enough to gain 
the nomination. Despite Obama’s final victory only a few days after the Keystone State 
primaries, the election math was not so clear – due to the Democratic Party’s system of 
proportional delegate allocation, it was quite possible that no candidate would obtain 
the required number of delegates, and the nomination would be decided at the Demo-
cratic Party Convention. Then, the super-delegates, 796 Democratic Party insiders, not 
pledged to any candidate, would have been under enormous pressure. If the party 
officials, and not the voters, would make a choice, whoever the eventual nominee 
would be, the defeated one would argue that the nomination was stolen from them. 
Definitely they would say the decision indicated no respect for their supporters, fol-
lowers, or voters. As history has shown, this might have been the fastest way to divide 
6  Anonymous official of the Pennsylvania Democratic Party, in conversation with the author, 
April 17, 2008. 
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the party only a few months before the election. While some compromise would still 
be possible, the perfect solution simply was hard to imagine at this point of the race.
A perfect solution for the Democrats would have been a ticket combined of Sena-
tor Clinton and Senator Obama. Party conventions nominate not only the presidential 
contender, but also a candidate for the second office, the vice-presidency. The so-
called dream ticket almost happened once, when after clinching the GOP 1980 presi-
dential nomination, Ronald Reagan intended the former vice-president and President 
Gerald Ford to run with him. Eventually, however, Reagan’s view that Ford had want-
ed too much prevailed, and he proposed the second spot to his main primary rival, 
George H. W. Bush. Such a combination would be more reasonable, especially after 
breaking down votes in Pennsylvania, where “Clinton had received strong support 
from whites – especially white women – while Obama excelled among African-Ameri-
cans and young voters” (“Primary toll;...” 2008: A22). Appealing to all these groups of 
voters is of a great importance in every election.
It is not certain whether Obama actually asked Hillary to join the ticket. Anyway, 
all he could expect to hear might be “Thanks, but no thanks.” Her political ambitions 
have been widely known since her graduation from the Yale Law School, some 35 
years ago. A successful lawyer, First Lady, and senator, all she wanted was the Presi-
dency. Accepting a second office meant postponing her Oval Office ambitions for an-
other eight years, which is an eternity in American politics. In addition, in 2016 Hillary 
Clinton will be close to her seventies, delivering another argument for her numerous 
opponents. 
At the time of the 2008 Pennsylvania primary, a more credible construction was 
one where Hillary topped the ballot, and Barack Obama was the vice-presidential 
candidate. Such a ticket was a perfect solution to unify Democratic Party, both base 
and differing factions, and appeal to some independent voters. Born in 1961 and with 
little Washington experience, Obama was perceived as almost a kid in politics, at 
least according to American standards. Many argued that the vice-presidency could be 
a great opportunity for him to “grow up” politically – to observe and participate in the 
decision-making process, and gained the required D.C. and executive branch experi-
ence. On the other hand, the vice-presidency, while much more important than at the 
beginning of the century, can equally turn out to be a springboard to the Oval Office 
or a dead end. It can be noticed that since 1804, when the existing system of presiden-
tial election was established, only Martin Van Buren and George H.W. Bush have won 
the presidential election while being sitting vice-presidents. “Another issue against the 
Clinton-Obama or Obama-Clinton ticket, was the Bill Clinton factor” (Balz 2008: A4). 
While it is the vice-president in the last few decades who has become a chief advisor 
of the President, it is easy to imagine the former federal executive branch leader as 
the “third one” in this political marriage. After all, the Clintons have been discussing 
politics for some forty years. But many bitter things were said on both sides. On the 
other hand, during the 1980 Republican Party primaries, even though George Bush 
frequently called his main rival’s economic program voodoo economics, this was not 
an obstacle for Reagan to nominate him for the second spot. 
What was known at the end of April 2008 was that the majority of Democratic 
Party registered voters in the Keystone State opted for Hillary Clinton in the state pri-
mary. The key question then was how the seven-week battle might affect the general 
election. It might have become an issue because out of two still-running candidates, 
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the long primary season could have possibly strengthened the third contender – Re-
publican Party presumptive nominee John McCain. “In an exit-poll interview, 16% of 
Obama supporters and 26% of Clinton backers said they would have abandoned the 
party in November had their candidate not secured the nomination” (“Primary toll;...” 
2008: A22). However, the Democrats were able to unify and come together after the 
Convention, and their great expectations before November were entirely legitimate. As 
Bob Herbert argued in the New York Times as early as in April, 
(...) the table is set for the Democrats. Nearly all issues are lined up in their favor. The na-
tional economy has cratered. The war in Iraq, after all these years, is still not going well. The 
Republicans have chosen a candidate who is neither charismatic nor inspirational, and who 
certainly does not represent change in what has shaped up to be a change election. If ever 
there was a race tailor-made for the Democratic, this is it (Herbert 2008: A27).
Herbert’s views also seemed to be supported by the model of forecasting which 
party would install their candidate in the White House, developed by Allan Lichtman 
and Ken DeCell. This model is based on two criteria: the incumbent party in the 
White House, and political trends of the previous four years and the election year. 
The model is constructed on thirteen questions: “if the incumbent party has five or 
fewer keys turned against it, then the party is re-elected; if the party has more than 
five keys against it, the incumbent party loses the presidency. The key questions are 
as follows:
1) After the midterm elections, the incumbent party holds more seats in the U.S. 
House than it did before the previous election.
2) There is no serious contest for the incumbent party’s nomination.
3) The incumbent’s party’s candidate is the sitting president.
4) There is no significant third party or independent campaign.
5) The economy is not in recession during the election campaign.
6) Real per capita economic growth during the term equals or exceeds mean 
growth during the previous two terms.
7) The incumbent administration effects major change in national policy. 
8) There is no sustained social unrest during the term.
9) The incumbent administration is untainted by major scandal.
10) The incumbent administration suffers no major failure in foreign policy or 
military affairs.
11) The incumbent administration achieves a major success in foreign or military 
affairs.
12) The incumbent party candidate is charismatic or a national hero.
13) The challenging party candidate is not charismatic or a national hero” (Licht-
man 2008: 3).
If the model is correct, the majority of these questions and answers worked rather 
against the incumbent administration of 2008. Therefore, some might argue Obama’s 
path to the Presidency was actually easier in November than in the primaries. And 
the Pennsylvania primary can be considered as a first chapter, or a preface, to the fall 
season. 
First of all, there were no other contests between March 11, the day of the Missis-
sippi primary, and April 22. It seems reasonable to argue that during these six weeks 
both candidates were actually running a national campaign. While the ground effort 
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was conducted mainly on the fields of the Keystone State, the state campaign was 
reported widely in the national media for two reasons: with Republicans nominating 
John McCain, eyes were turned towards the Democrats, and Pennsylvania was a must-
win race, if Hillary Clinton wanted her campaign to be continued. With attention on 
that primary, the whole nation was watching Obama’s ability to spend three times as 
much as Hillary in the state. As it was spent mainly on ads, and more importanly, in 
the western counties of the state, which are in the Ohio media market, many voters 
whose decision was crucial in the fall were able to observe Obama’s organizational 
strength and fund-raising talents. Moreover, Obama showed great leadership potential 
and free-media generating skills, especially after the so-called A More Perfect Union 
Speech, when on April 8 in the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, he gave 
an emotional talk on race. For more than a week, every conversation, either on a 
bus, in a gym, in the bank, or in the classroom, started with Did you hear about THE 
SPEECH? 
Finally, that primary demonstrated the real strength of Obama as a serious con-
tender, and the bouncing back and forth theme was the claim, both in the media and 
in people’s conversations, that Hillary remained very divisive as a politician and as a 
person. For a candidate who was physically present in the state only for a couple of 
days, losing by ten points against an opponent who had moved to Pennsylvania for 
six weeks, was campaigning with all her family, and was actively supported by the 
former U.S. President, state governor, and the party’s local machine, but most of all 
had lived in Pennsylvania for a few years as a child, in the long term might not have 
necessarily been seen as a defeat. During the Pennsylvania primary, Senator Barack 
Obama truly emerged as a national candidate who strengthened his organization, and 
convinced many super-delegates and media people to support his candidacy. And if 
we consider that a long primary season does not necessarily mean less chance in the 
general election, the epic battle on the fields of the Keystone State could actually do 
more good than harm for him. As John McCain had clinched his nomination relatively 
quickly, he did not campaign hard in Pennsylvania, and did not have to do so in the 
remaining states. Thus he might have been less known as a candidate than Obama, 
especially to voters who do not follow politics in their everyday life, and show inter-
est in it only during the first few days of November. With the extended primary, and 
higher rate of presence on TV and radio of the remaining contenders, this fact might 
have been a harmful factor for the McCain campaign, in particular when we consider 
that the election was projected to be close. In addition, “of 8.3 million voters who 
registered to vote in the Pennsylvania primary, 4.2 million registered as Democrats, 
and 3.2 million as Republicans” (Skiba 2008: 27). Democrats were also able to regis-
ter four times more new voters, and ten times more independents and people with 
different party registration (however, the bias of the cross-over voters – “the practice 
of members of one political party voting in the other party’s primary, presumably to 
nominate the weaker candidate” (Maisel, Buckley 2005: 216) – should be taken into 
consideration). Even after the November results it is hard to assess whether it was 
better to have longer primaries, for there is no argument that Obama’s chief strategist 
David Axelrod used the primary season to built the organization that also proved its 
efficiency in the fall. What impact, if any, the Pennsylvania primary had on the No-
vember results, is a question for another paper. 
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